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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
JAY D. FERRY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8181 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Jay D. Ferry was convicted of the offense of carnal 
knowledge and sentenced to a term of not to exceed five 
years in the Utah State Penitentiary. From the conviction 
and sentence, he appeals. 
The complaining witness, mother of one June Peer, 
the person against whom the criminal act was committed, 
and the said June Peer failed to appear at the trial (R. 2). 
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The trial court refused a motion by the State for a con-
tinuance which was based upon the absence of these wit- 1 ~1 
nesses (R. 2). Thereafter, the court, in the absence of the 
jury, considered the State's offer of proof including the 
voluntariness of the confession of the defendant, (Exhibit 
1) the proffered proof of the corpus delicti, and the de-
fendant's objections thereto (R. 6 to 101). The court then 
ruled thereupon (R. 101 to 103). The trial resumed .in the 
presence of the jury and the State called as its first witness 
Lillian Webb Taylor (R. 104). Mrs. Taylor testified that 
she had known since birth (June 27, 1938) one June Peer 
(R. 105). A certified copy of the birth certificate of June 
Peer was, by stipulation of counsel, accepted in evidence 
(R. 105). Culbert Robison, County Sheriff, was re-called 
as a witness for the State (R. 106). Sheriff Robison testi-
fied that he was acquainted with the defendant and had 
known the defendant for about two years; (R. 106, 107) 
that he was present at the County Attorney's office in Delta, 
Utah, during a conversation had on July 30th, 1953, be-
tween the defendant and June Peer in the presence of the 
County Attorney and himself; (R. 107, 108) the sheriff 
testified that during this conversation June Peer related an 
act of intercourse had by herself with the defendant; (R. 
109) that she, June Peer, said to the defendant, "Isn't that 
right, Jay?" And Jay said, "Yes" (R. 110). The witness 
thereafter testified as to further details of the conversation 
and to the statements of June Peer and the defendant as to 
the act of intercourse, the particular place where it was 
consummated and as to the State's Exhibit 1, the confession 
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of the defendant (R. 110 to 139). It was stipulated that 
the offense took place in Millard County (R. 126). 
0. J. Bennet, Deputy Sheriff, was called as a witness 
for the State (R. 140). The deputy testified that he was 
acquainted with the defendant, (R. 140) and that he had 
contacted the defendant officially and told him to stay away 
from June Peer;"* * * I told him he better stay away 
from her, to leave her alone * * *" (R. 141). The wit-
ness further testified that he was present in the County 
Attorney's office when the defendant confessed to the of-
fense and as to the circumstances thereof ; ( R. 142 to 146) 
that he witnessed the defendant's signature thereto (R. 
144). 
The State's Exhibit 1, confession of the defendant, was 
introduced in evidence and read to the jury (R. 146 to 150). 
The State rests (R. 150). 
Defendant's motion to· dismiss the charge was over-
ruled and denied (R. 151, 152). 
John H. Ferry, the father of Jay Ferry, was called as 
a witness for the defense (R. 153). The witness testified 
as to the defendant's educational background; (R. 153, 
154) as to the preliminary hearing; (R. 154, 155) as to 
events following the hearing (R. 155 to 157). The defen-
dant was called on his own behalf (R. 157). He testified 
as to his educational background; (R. 157) as to his appre-
hension on or about July 22nd, 1953; (R. 158) as to the 
circumstances surrounding his confession and as to its 
subsequent amendment; (R. 158 to 162) that he was in fear 
that if he did not sign the confession he would be returned 
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to prison for violation of parole (R. 162, 163). There was 
adduced from the witness no evidence of the nature of a 
former committed offense. On cross-examination, the de-
fendant testified that he had not read the full context of his 
confession; (R. 163) that there were parts of it he did not 
understand; (R. 164 to 166) that he did not remember 
whether the statement (confession) had been read to him 
or not; (R. 166) that, "The statement wasn't read to me" 
(R. 167). The witness further testified that he discussed 
the contents of the confession with June Peer and that he 
"corrected" it by writing on the margin thereof (R. 167 to 
170). The defense rests (R. 170). 
The jury returned its verdict and found the defendant 
guilty of carnal knowledge of a female under the age of 
eighteen years and over the age of thirteen years as charged 
in the information. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE STATE 
WAS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE CORPUS 
DELICTI. 
ARGUl\1ENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE STATE 
WAS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE CORPUS 
DELICTI. 
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The only question here to be determined is : Was there 
sufficient evidence introduced upon the trial to establish 
the "corpus delicti" of the crime of carnal knowledge to 
that degree necessary before the confession of the defen-
dant could be received in evidence? Lack of such evidence 
is the sole error complained of by appellant. 
Appellant contends that it is essential that the corpus 
delicti should be established fully and completely by evi-
dence independent of the confession before the latter could 
properly be received in evidence. We concede that a con-
fession alone is not sufficient to establish the fact that a 
crime has been committed, but we respectfully contend that 
it may be competent evidence of that fact. Where, as in this 
case, there are corroborative circumstances, the confession 
may be considered with such circumstances to establish. the 
corpus delicti of the crime. For this contention we direct 
the court's attention to the following authorities: 
"Proof of the corpus delicti may be by circum-
stantial evidence. Where defendant has confessed 
commission of the crime, the confession may be con-
sidered in connection with other evidence to estab-
lish the corpus delicti and it is sufficient if it is 
corroborated by other evidence. * * *" 
State v. DeHart, 242 Wis. 562, 8 N. W. 2d 360; Phillips v. 
State, 196 Miss. 194, 16 So. 2d 630. 
"While a voluntary confession is insufficient, 
standing alone, to prove that a crime has been com-
mitted, it is, nevertheless, competent evidence of 
that fact, and may, with slight corroborative cir-
cumstances, establish the corpus delicti as well as 
the defendant's guilty participation." 
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Sullivan v. State, 58 Neb. 796, 79 N. W. 721. 
"The rule requiring corroboration of a confes-
sion is met if the additional evidence is sufficient 
to convince the jury that the crime charged is real 
and not imaginary." 
Bunch v. People, 87 Colo. 84, 285 P. 766. See also, Short v. 
People, 27 Colo. 175, 60 P. 350; 7 Wigmore on Evidence 
(3d Ed.) §§ 2070, 2071. 
The rule is that the law demands, and only demands, 
the best proof of the corpus delicti which, in the nature of 
the case, is attainable. State v. Ramo, 185 P. 2d 757, 767. 
This court in State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 83 P. 2d 1010, 
concerned itself with the identical question here presented 
as to whether there was sufficient independent proof of 
the corpus delicti to render a confession admissable in evi-
dence. That case would appear to make clear, every such 
question must necessarily be determined in the light of the 
particular facts of the case. It is there held, however, that: 
"* * * the corroborating fact or facts need 
not independently of the confession conclusively 
prove the corpus delicti." 
In the later case of State v. Cronk, et al., ... Utah ... , 142 
P. 2d 178, 183, this court affirmed the rule as stated in 
State v. Johnson, supra, and went on to say: 
"Of course, in some cases, the proof of the cor-
pus delicti may bring in the confession, because the 
confession itself is so linked in time and place with 
the commission of the offense that as a practical 
matter the proof of the two are not segregable." 
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The corpus delicti in a prosecution for carnal knowledge 
is the substantial fact of intercourse, and a confession may 
render sufficient circumstantial evidence that would be in-
sufficient without it. See Watson v. State, (Texas) 227 
S. W. 2d 559 and Preston v. State, (Texas) 242 S. W. 2d 
436. 
For the case at bar, what is there in the evidence out-
side of the confession to establish the act of intercourse? 
Subsequent to making the confession, the appellant ad-
mitted to the act; the scene of the crime was established 
and stipulated to; it was shown that appellant had been 
warned to stay away from and leave alone the victim. Fur-
ther, the appellant desired to marry the victim; appellant 
had employed counsel ; he discussed the details of his con-
fession with the victim and made corrections thereto. All 
of which was sufficient evidence to convince the jury that 
the crime charged was real and not imaginary and which, 
when permissably coupled with the confession, was suf-
ficient to establish the corpus delicti. 
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CONCLUSION 
We believe that the rights of persons accused of crime 
should be zealously guard,ed. We do not believe that rules 
of evidence promulgated tq protect such rights should be 
extended to constitute a fortress impregnable to justice. 
The conviction and sentence should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
PATRICK H. FENTON, 
District Attorney (5th District), 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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